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Visual awarenessInvestigating the limits of unconscious processing is essential to understand the function of
consciousness. Here, we explored whether holistic face processing, a mechanism believed
to be important for face processing in general, can be accomplished unconsciously. Using a
novel ‘‘eyes-face’’ stimulus we tested whether discrimination of pairs of eyes was inﬂu-
enced by the surrounding face context. While the eyes were fully visible, the faces that pro-
vided context could be rendered invisible through continuous ﬂash suppression. Two
experiments with three different sets of face stimuli and a subliminal learning procedure
converged to show that invisible faces did not inﬂuence perception of visible eyes. In con-
trast, surrounding faces, when they were clearly visible, strongly inﬂuenced perception of
the eyes. Thus, we conclude that conscious awareness might be a prerequisite for holistic
face processing.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Most people are good at recognizing faces, which is a capacity that is usually taken for granted. Yet, given that all faces
are essentially very similar (e.g., all faces have a nose, eyes, and mouth; relative position of features is largely the same), the
cognitive task of face recognition is far from straightforward. A key component of efﬁcient facial processing is considered to
be holistic processing (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011) – the ability to perceive a
face as a whole and not as a set of independent features. Probably the most spectacular demonstration of this phenomenon
is the composite face effect (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987) – that is, when a facial image is composed of the bottom and
top halves of two different faces, where recognition of one half of a face (e.g., the top part) is modulated by that of the other
half (e.g., the bottom part). Holistic face processing in general, and the composite face effect in particular, has been
extensively explored in healthy populations using behavioral measures (for review: Rossion, 2013), functional MRI (e.g.,
Andrews, Davies-Thompson, Kingstone, & Young, 2010; Axelrod, 2010; Axelrod & Yovel, 2010, 2011; Schiltz, Dricot,
Goebel, & Rossion, 2010; Schiltz & Rossion, 2006) and event-related potentials (e.g., Jacques & Rossion, 2009; Wiese,
Kachel, & Schweinberger, 2013) as well as in participants with impaired face recognition (prosopagnosia) (Avidan,
Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Busigny & Rossion, 2011). However, whether conscious awareness is required for holistic face
processing is not known.
Understanding the role of consciousness and conscious awareness is one of the fundamental challenges of the cognitive
sciences (Baars, 1993; Dennett, 1993; Koch, 2004). Empirically, the level of conscious awareness is usually evaluated by an
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discrimination, even for subjectively unaware stimulus) (Merikle & Daneman, 1998). While qualitative differences between
conscious and unconscious perception have been debated for years (e.g., Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Peremen & Lamy, 2014;
Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003), numerous behavioral (e.g., Marcel, 1983; Mudrik, Breska, Lamy,
& Deouell, 2011; Sklar et al., 2012) and neuroimaging (e.g., Axelrod, Bar, Rees, & Yovel, 2014; Dehaene et al., 2001; Fahrenfort
et al., 2012; Sterzer, Haynes, & Rees, 2008) studies demonstrate that information can be processed unconsciously. Uncon-
scious face processing is one of the widely explored types of unconscious processing. A large body of evidence suggests that
emotional aspects of face processing (for reviews: Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010), gaze (Chen & Yeh,
2012; Stein, Peelen, & Sterzer, 2012; Stein, Senju, Peelen, & Sterzer, 2011) and face familiarity (de Gardelle, Charles, &
Kouider, 2011; Henson, Mouchlianitis, Matthews, & Kouider, 2008; Kouider, Eger, Dolan, & Henson, 2009) can be processed
without conscious awareness; however, several studies have shown that facial identity (Moradi, Koch, & Shimojo, 2005;
Stein & Sterzer, 2011; Stone & Valentine, 2005) and face gender/race (Amihai, Deouell, & Bentin, 2011) cannot be processed
unconsciously. In the present study, we addressed the question of unconscious face processing from another angle, while
asking whether holistic face processing can take place unconsciously. Based on the previous negative results of unconscious
face identity/gender processing, and given that face recognition and holistic processing might share common underlying
mechanisms (Richler, Cheung et al., 2011; Wang, Li, Fang, Tian, & Liu, 2012), one possibility is that holistic face processing
cannot be accomplished without conscious awareness. Alternatively, it is also possible that holistic face processing is a more
basic type of processing than face recognition, which implies that holistic processing might still occur unconsciously. In addi-
tion, given that holistic processing has been suggested to be an automatic process (Richler, Wong, & Gauthier, 2011), it there-
fore possibly could be executed unconsciously (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).
In the present study, we devised a novel ‘‘eyes-face’’ composite stimulus that was composed of a pair of eyes plus the
remaining part of the face [c.f., top and bottom image face parts (Young et al., 1987)]. Participants had to discriminate
between pairs of eyes in two consecutively presented composite images while the rest of the face was either the same or
different (Fig. 1A and B). Critically, in the subliminal version of the paradigm, while the eyes were always visible, the rest
of the face was rendered invisible using Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS; Fig. 1B) (Harris, Schwarzkopf, Song,
Bahrami, & Rees, 2011; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). We asked whether invisible faces inﬂuenced discrimination of the visible
eyes.
2. Experiment 1
In this experiment, we used three different sets of composite faces. The ﬁrst set was comprised of ﬁve male composite
faces (examples of faces: Fig. 1B left side). To increase the perceptual differences between images, a second set included
three male and three female composite faces (examples of faces: Fig. 1C, top). The third set of images was comprised of three
female faces, either with or without eyebrows (examples of faces: Fig. 1C, bottom). The motivation to include this third com-
posite image set was that eyebrows are the closest facial feature to the eyes and, consequently, have a higher chance of being
attended to when the task is eyes discrimination.
Participants were presented with two consecutive composite faces that contained visible eyes and faces. The face part of
each image was rendered invisible by CFS (Fig. 1B). The pairs of eyes in the two images were always the same, and the invis-
ible faces were either the same or different. The task was to report whether successive pairs of visible eyes were the same or
different. Participants were told that this eyes discrimination task was very difﬁcult, and were encouraged to look out for the
smallest differences between the two stimuli. Notably, because the stimuli did not appear in the exact same screen position
(a small amount of spatial jitter was added; see Methods) and the eyes were surrounded by a constantly changing CFS mask,
it was not evident that sequential eye stimuli were actually identical. Effect size was deﬁned in percent units as the percent
of trials answered ‘‘eyes same’’ when the invisible faces of the two images were the same minus the percent of trials
answered ‘‘eyes same’’ when the invisible faces of the two images were different. An effect size larger than zero was taken
as evidence of a subliminal inﬂuence of the invisible faces on judgments of the visible eyes.
2.1. Methods: Experiment 1
2.1.1. Participants
Fifteen healthy volunteers (age 20–27 years, 10 females) participated in this experiment: all participants participated in
the experiment with image set 1 (male faces), 14 of the same set of participants participated in the experiment with image
set 2 (male and female faces), and 12 of the same set of participants took part in the experiment with image set 3 (faces with
and without eyebrows). Two participants were excluded from the analysis of all three experiments because they reported
that they could see the masked face. The experiment was approved by Tel-Aviv University ethics committee, and all partic-
ipants gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.
2.1.2. Apparatus
For stimuli presentation, a CRT 17-in. color monitor was used. Screen resolution was 1024  768, and refresh rate was
85 Hz. Stimuli were presented using MATLAB 7.6 with Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). Participants sat in a comfortable chair
at a distance from the monitor of 30 cm. During the experiment, the room lights were turned off.
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Fig. 1. Experiment ﬂow and examples of stimuli used in the study. (A) Schematic ﬂow of a trial. (B) Examples of the stimuli while the left and right columns
show the stimuli as they were projected to non-dominant and dominant eye, respectively. The right column also depicts the actual percept of the stimuli.
Two rows (in red and blue frames) were the two conditions used in the experiment. Note that eyes were the same in all images. (C) Examples of the stimuli
from the male and female image set (top) and from the image set ‘‘with and without eyebrows’’ (bottom).
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All image manipulations were performed in Adobe Photoshop CS2. Face stimuli (neutral face expressions) were taken
from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (Lundqvist & Litton, 1998). Image set 1 consisted of ﬁve male face identities
(examples of faces: Fig. 1B, left side), and image set 2 consisted of three male and three female face identities (examples of
faces: Fig. 1C, top). Image set 3 consisted of three female face identities – three original images and three images where the
eyebrows were removed using Adobe Photoshop program (examples of faces: Fig. 1C, bottom). Five pairs of eyes (rectangle
with the eyes, Fig. 1B) were cropped from different face images (not used in image sets 1–3) and integrated into each face
image of the experimental image sets 1–3. The same pairs of eyes were used for all image sets. The size of the rectangle con-
taining the eyes was identical for all pairs of eyes (see below). The resultant image sets included 25 stimuli each (ﬁve face
identities with ﬁve pairs of eyes) for image set 1, and 30 stimuli each (six face identities with ﬁve pairs of the eyes) for image
sets 2 and 3. None of the composite faces had original (‘‘native’’) eyes. The images were in color. Face images were positioned
in the center of the rectangular background image frame, which was a light grey color (RGB: 97, 97, 97) (see Fig. 1B). Dimen-
sions of the stimuli were as follows (in degrees of visual angle): background square frame (vertical: 27, horizontal: 27); face
image (vertical: 21, horizontal: 16.5); eyes rectangle (vertical: 3.3, horizontal: 14.5).
2.1.4. Invisibility manipulation
To render stimuli invisible, we used Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). The paradigm was
designed in such a way that the eyes rectangle was fully visible with both eyes, whereas the remaining part of the face
was invisible (Harris et al., 2011). During the experiment, participants wore cardboard anaglyph red/cyan glasses. The visible
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color channel (visible using red ﬁlter), while a Mondrian mask was projected using green/blue channels. The Mondrian mask
appeared over the whole background rectangle frame with the exception of the visible stimulus part (see Fig. 1B). The posi-
tion of the visible eyes rectangle was ﬁxed relative to the Mondrian image. In addition, on the Mondrian masks, we drew an
elliptic contour line at the location of the invisible face (see Fig. 1B, right side). The motivation for adding this contour ellipse
was to urge participants to make eye judgments as though the eyes were part of a face. The elliptic contour line was created
by increasing the brightness of the corresponding mask pixels by 20%. The ellipse contour was created at the same position
for all mask images and was at a ﬁxed position relative to the eyes rectangle. Mondrian masks were prepared by randomly
scrambling a kaleidoscope image. Our preliminary pilots showed that use of this pattern achieved higher invisibility effects
than the geometrical shapes usually used (e.g., Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005).
Mondrian masks were replaced continuously at a frequency of 10 Hz (every 100 ms). During the invisible part of Exper-
iment 1, the face composite stimuli were always projected to the non-dominant eye of the participant while the CFS mask
was presented to the dominant eye. Eye dominance was tested by asking participants to view a distant object through a hole
made by the ﬁngers of their two hands (‘‘Miles test’’) (Mendola & Conner, 2007; Miles, 1930). In the visible sessions, the par-
ticipants wore specially prepared glasses with two red lenses (stimuli visible through both eyes and mask invisible through
both eyes). Using this approach, we preserved the same quality of stimulation for visible and invisible sessions.
2.1.5. Experimental design
For each one of three image sets, there were three experimental sessions: eyes discrimination session with invisible face
images, awareness invisibility test of discriminating invisible face images, and eyes discrimination session with visible face
images. To minimize the number of switches between tasks, participants ﬁrst performed three sessions of eyes discrimina-
tion with invisible face images (all three image sets), then three sessions of awareness invisibility (all three image sets;
explained below), and ﬁnally three sessions of eyes discrimination with visible face images (all three image sets). The order
of the image sets within these three sessions was counterbalanced across participants. From the side of stimuli presentation
(computer code), all three experimental sessions were exactly the same for each image set.
A trial consisted of two consecutively presented stimuli (each stimulus duration = 0.3 s, interstimulus interval
[ISI] = 0.1 s) (Fig. 1A). There was a random position jitter between two stimuli (2% of stimulus size). The eyes in two images
of a trial were always the same, whereas the faces were either the same (50% of the trials) or different (50% of the trials). For
image set 1 (males only set), the different faces were of different male face identities. For image set 2 (males and females set)
the different faces were each composed of different identities from opposite genders (either male–female or female–male,
counterbalanced). For image set 3 (with and without eyebrows), the different faces were the same identity presented twice
with and without eyebrows (either no eyebrows – eyebrows or eyebrows – no eyebrows). In the ‘‘invisible’’ sessions, only the
eyes were visible; in the ‘‘visible’’ sessions (at the end of the experiment), both the eyes and faces were visible. Participants
were asked to make their response after the second stimulus disappeared.
In the eyes discrimination experiment, participants had to press ‘1’ if the two pairs of eyes were the same and ‘2’ if the
two pairs were different. The fact that the pairs of eyes were always the same was not known by participants. Participants
were told before the experiment that the task would be very difﬁcult and that any slight difference that they perceived
between the two eye pairs should be taken as an indication of the presence of a difference between the eyes. Our preliminary
pilot tests showed that presenting the two stimuli with a slight spatial jitter and a constant change in CFS mask around the
eyes created an impression that the eyes were not actually identical. Indeed, at the informal debrieﬁng after the experiment,
participants indicated that they had seen differences between the pairs of eyes.
Awareness test sessions were very similar to the eyes discrimination sessions; the only difference was that participants
had to discriminate between invisible faces (‘1’: same faces, ‘2’: different faces); since the participants admitted seeing noth-
ing, they were encouraged to guess. Participants were asked not to use the visible eyes in the discrimination; instead, they
were encouraged to try to discriminate based on the non-eye part of the image (inside the ellipse). Each session consisted of
50 trials (25 trials with the same faces and 25 with different faces). At the beginning of the experiment, before the ﬁrst ses-
sion with invisible face images, participants underwent a short training session (10 trials) of eyes discrimination with invis-
ible faces. As face stimuli, we used two male identities that were not used afterwards in the experimental sessions.
2.1.6. Data analysis
Data were analyzed using MATLAB and SPSS 17 software. The effect size for the eyes discrimination task was calculated as
the percent of trials answered ‘‘same’’ when the face identities of the two images were actually the same minus the percent
of trials answered ‘‘same’’ when the face identities were different. An effect size larger than zero provided evidence that a
change in face inﬂuenced perception of the eyes. Signiﬁcance at the group level was established using non-parametric Wil-
coxon Signed Rank test (signrank MATLAB function). In the visual awareness tests, the individual d-prime values [signal
detection theory (Macmillan, 2002)] of discrimination invisible stimuli (correct/incorrect) were assessed using non-paramet-
ric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test vs. zero. For all the parametric tests (ANOVAs and correlations), the data was ﬁrst tested for
normality using Lilliefors test (lillietest MATLAB function). Reaction times of participants were not analyzed since the par-
ticipants were asked to respond only when the second stimulus of the trial disappeared, and they were asked to maximize
accuracy and not to minimize response time. To calculate the Bayes factor, we used the online calculator of Zoltan Dienes
(http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm).
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Judgment of visible eyes was not inﬂuenced by invisible faces in any of the image sets (Fig. 2, left side) [males only set 1:
effect size: 3.4%, MSE: 3.7%, p = .26, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 29.5, one Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank test vs. 0; males and
females set 2: effect size: 4.1%, MSE: 3.7%, p = .29, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 27; with and without eyebrows set 3: effect size:
6.4%, MSE: 4.8%, p = .19, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 11.5]. For raw response rates of ‘‘same eyes’’ answers, see Table 1, ﬁrst
row. Invisibility of faces was tested in separate sessions, with stimulus conﬁgurations identical to the main experiment,
but the participants were required to discriminate between the invisible faces. Discrimination of faces did not differ signif-
icantly from chance for all three image sets [males only set 1: d-prime: 0.082, MSE: 0.11, p = .47, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 25;
males and females set 2: d-prime: 0.15, MSE: 0.2, p = .50, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 25.5; males and females set 3: d-prime:
0.028, MSE: 0.13, p = .95, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 22] (raw response rates, Table 1, second row). Contrarily to invisible faces,
judgment of visible eyes was strongly inﬂuenced by visible faces in all image sets (Fig. 2, right side) [males only set 1: effect
size: 51.7%, MSE: 7%, p = .001, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 0; males and females set 2: effect size: 54.2%, MSE: 7.2%, p = .002, Wil-
coxon sign-rank = 0; with and without eyebrows set 3: effect size: 42.8%, MSE: 7.6%, p = .005, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 0] (raw
response rates, Table 1, third row). The difference between invisible and visible faces was conﬁrmed by the two-way
repeated measured ANOVA analysis with image set and face visibility as factors: there was a highly signiﬁcant main effect
of face visibility: F(1,9) = 118.425, p < .001 but non-signiﬁcant main effect of image set [F(2,18) = 3, p = .075] and non-signif-
icant interaction between image set and face visibility [F(2,18) < 1].
Experiment 1 found no evidence that invisible faces inﬂuence the perception of visible eyes. Notably, the ‘‘null effect’’ for
invisible faces may stem either from a lack of sensitivity or, alternatively, from the phenomenological absence of uncon-
scious processing (Dienes, 2011, in press). Since the orthodox (Neyman and Pearson) statistical approach is unable to distin-
guish between these two possibilities, we adopted a Bayesian approach (Dienes, 2011). That is, the Neyman and Pearson
approach, by deﬁnition, might only ﬁnd support for the alternative hypothesis (rejecting H0 and accepting H1), but cannot
provide support for the H0 hypothesis (when H1 is not accepted). A Bayesian approach (Bayes factor), in contrast, can provide
support for either H0 or H1 (Dienes, in press). As the data input parameters, we used effect size and mean square error (Jiang
et al., 2012). To model the expectation parameters, following the recommendation of Dienes (Dienes, 2011), we consulted
previous studies that also explored unconscious face processing using the CFS paradigm (Amihai et al., 2011; Moradi
et al., 2005; Yang, Hong, & Blake, 2010). In particular, the effect size during unconscious face processing in these studies
was at least two times smaller compared to that during conscious processing (Yang et al., 2010), whereas in some cases
it was ﬁve to ten times smaller (Amihai et al., 2011; Moradi et al., 2005). Therefore, given that the effect size in the conscious
condition of our study was on average 50%, the unconscious mean prediction was deﬁned as 7.5% and the standard deviation
was set to 5% (two-tailed normal distribution). The results of the analysis revealed the following: for the males-only set 1, the
Bayes factor was 0.07; for the males-and-females set 2, the Bayes factor was 0.95; and for the eyebrows set 3, the Bayes fac-
tor was 0.23. Thus, the Bayes factor values in sets 1 and 3 provide strong support for the phenomenological absence of
unconscious processing (Bayes factor < 0.33); the results of set 2 should be interpreted as a ‘‘lack of sensitivity’’ (0.33 < Bayes
factor < 3) (Dienes, 2011).
3. Experiment 2
In the current experiment, we asked whether there was a way to improve unconscious holistic processing by means of
subliminal learning with feedback (e.g., Atas, Faivre, Timmermans, Cleeremans, & Kouider, 2014; Di Luca, Ernst, & Backus,
2010; Nishina, Seitz, Kawato, & Watanabe, 2007; Rosenthal & Humphreys, 2010; Watanabe, Náñez, & Sasaki, 2001). Partic-
ipants underwent half an hour of subliminal learning with feedback, which was based on same/different invisible faces (see-20
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Table 1
Experiment 1: percent of trials answered the ‘‘same’’ when faces were ‘‘same’’ or ‘‘different’’. In the other words, the values denote the percentages of the same
answers binned for the type of stimuli (same or different faces). Columns represent three image sets and rows represent task and visibility manipulation. Values
in parentheses denote standard error of the mean.
Males only set 1 Males and females set 2 Eyebrows set 3
Invisible faces Same: 62.1% (5.4%) Same: 71.6% (4.6%) Same: 65.2% (4.5%)
Task: eyes discrimination Different: 65.5% (4.8%) Different: 67.5% (5.2%) Different: 71.6% (5.6%)
Invisible faces Same: 58.2% (5.5%) Same: 59.7% (4.1%) Same: 64.1% (4.1%)
Task: faces discrimination Different: 42.8% (6.8%) Different: 46.8% (5.4%) Different: 37.9% (5.3%)
Visible faces Same: 79.4% (3.3%) Same: 88.7% (2.6%) Same: 84.8% (3.7%)
Task: eyes discrimination Different: 27.7% (5.8%) Different: 34.5% (7.2%) Different: 42% (8.2%)
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ination) of the visible eyes. The ﬂow of this experiment is shown in Fig. 3. This experiment used the image set with ﬁve male
faces (two versions: intact and shifted eyes; described below). To verify that, as a result of repetitive exposure during learn-
ing, the invisible part of the stimulus (face) did not become visible (e.g., Atas, Vermeiren, & Cleeremans, 2013; Schwiedrzik,
Singer, & Melloni, 2009, 2011), participants underwent an invisible face awareness test before and after learning. In addition,
unrelated to subliminal learning, participants were tested with a set of stimuli in which the original ﬁve male stimuli were
manipulated in such a way that the rectangle of the eyes in all images was shifted (Fig. 4A). Similar manipulations are effec-
tive in disrupting holistic face processing (e.g., Axelrod & Yovel, 2010; Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; McKone,
Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007). Our plan was to compare the magnitude of any inﬂuence of invisible faces between an intact
and shifted eyes stimuli set. Critically, in order to conclude that any effect, if found, was related to holistic processing, the
magnitude of this effect must be higher for the intact eyes than for the shifted eyes stimuli set.Stimuli: intact eyes
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3.1.1. Participants
Eighteen healthy volunteers (ages 19–30, 13 females) participated in this experiment. Two participants were excluded
from the analysis because they reported consciously seeing the masked face. The experiment was approved by Tel-Aviv Uni-
versity’s ethics committee, and all participants gave informed consent to participate.
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The same as in Experiment 1.
3.1.3. Stimuli
The image set with ﬁvemale identities fromExperiment 1was used in this experiment. In addition, based on this image set,
we created a second image set where the eyes rectangle was shifted to the left 6.5 degrees of a visual angle (see Fig. 4A). The
empty eye positionwas ﬁlledwith a uniform average color taken from the surrounding facial features (RGB: 217, 112, 67). The
horizontal size of the background rectangle frames for both intact and shifted eye sets were increased to 35 of a visual angle.
3.1.4. Invisibility manipulation
The same as in Experiment 1.
3.1.5. Experimental design
The ﬂow of the experiment is presented in Fig. 3. For each of the two image sets (intact and shifted eyes), there were ﬁve
experimental sessions: two sessions with invisible face images, where eyes had to be discriminated (one before and one after
learning), two awareness invisibility tests of discriminating invisible face images (one before and one after learning), and an
eyes discrimination session with visible face images. The awareness invisibility tests always followed the eyes discrimination
sessions with invisible face images. The eyes discrimination sessionwith visible face imageswas always the last session of the
experiment. The order of intact and shifted eyes sessionswas counterbalanced between participants. All sessions of this exper-
iment (including the learning sessions; see below) consisted of 30 trials (15 trials with same faces and 15with different faces).
The learning procedure included 14 sessions. These learning sessions had the same design as the testing sessions (eyes
discrimination test) with the exception of a correct/incorrect indication after each trial (feedback) and overall score at the
end of the session. While participants’ task was to discriminate between pairs of eyes, the correct/incorrect answer indica-
tion was based on same/different invisible faces. In particular, the answer was deﬁned as correct if the participant answered
‘‘same’’ when the two invisible identities were the same or answered ‘‘different’’ when the two invisible identities were dif-
ferent. At the end of each learning session, participants received their session scores (percentage of correct answers). At the
informal debrieﬁng after the experiment, participants were asked based which parameters had served as the basis for their
development of the ability to discriminate between the pairs of eyes. All participants indicated that their decision had been
based on either eye shape, distance between the eyes, or eye color.
3.1.6. Data analysis
The analysis procedure of non-learning sessions was the same as in Experiment 1. The signiﬁcance of a learning effect was
evaluated using linear regression analyses, which were applied for group (averaged) and individual data. The procedure for
the group-level linear regression analysis was as follows: (1) effect size values for each session were averaged across partic-
ipants resulting in averaged effect size values (Fig. 4C); (2) these effect size values were submitted to linear regression; and
(3) a regression line slope coefﬁcient signiﬁcantly different from zero was used to support the learning effect (Weisberg,
2005). The procedure for the individual-level linear regression analysis was as follows: (1) for each participant, the effect
size values were submitted to linear regression; (2) the individual linear regression slope coefﬁcients were obtained and sub-
mitted to Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (slope coefﬁcients vs. zero test).
3.2. Results: Experiment 2
In line with the results of Experiment 1, before learning, invisible faces did not inﬂuence the judgment of visible eyes
for both intact and shifted eye sets (Fig. 4B, leftmost bars) (intact eyes: effect size: 2.1%, MSE: 3.9%, p = .69, WilcoxonTable 2
Experiment 2: percent of trials answered the ‘‘same’’ when faces were ‘‘same’’ or
‘‘different’’. In the other words, the values denote the percentages of the same answers
binned for the type of stimuli (same or different faces). Columns represent eyes position
(intact or shifted) and rows represent task/visibility manipulation and the time of testing.
Values in parentheses denote standard error of the mean.
Intact eyes Shifted eyes
Invisible faces, before learning Same: 56.6% (5.1%) Same: 61.2% (4.2%)
Task: eyes discrimination Different: 58.7% (5.4%) Different: 66.2% (4%)
Invisible faces, after learning Same: 67.9% (3.3%) Same: 73.3% (4.7%)
Task: eyes discrimination Different: 57.5% (4.7%) Different: 62.1% (4.3%)
Invisible faces, before learning Same: 45.2% (4%) Same: 48.7% (2.9%)
Task: faces discrimination Different: 55.2% (4.5%) Different: 51.9% (4%)
Invisible faces, after learning Same: 51.6% (2.8%) Same: 54.2% (3.9%)
Task: faces discrimination Different: 50.8% (3.5%) Different: 49.2% (2.7%)
Visible faces, end of experiment Same: 79.6% (3.7%) Same: 72.5% (4.8%)
Task: eyes discrimination Different: 31.3% (4.4%) Different: 69.6% (4.6%)
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row). The Bayes factor, modeled with the same parameters as in Experiment 1, was 0.23 for the intact eyes set and 0.21 for
the shifted eye set. Thus, for both image sets, the results of the Bayesian analysis (Bayes factor) suggested the absence of
unconscious processing.
Participants then completed a subliminal learning task with feedback using the intact eyes image set. Average learning
results across participants are shown in Fig. 4C; as seen, performance gradually improved across sessions (slope coefﬁ-
cient = 1.12, signiﬁcantly different from zero: t(13) = 5.56, p < .001). To examine the effect of learning at an individual level,
a linear regression model was estimated for each participant; the resultant individual slope coefﬁcients were signiﬁcantly
above zero [Wilcoxon Signed Rank test: p = .0086, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 5.5]. After learning, participants were tested again
(sessions without feedback), and we observed a signiﬁcant effect of the invisible face on visible eyes judgments for both
intact and shifted eyes sets (Fig. 4B, middle bars) [intact eyes: effect size: 10.4%, MSE: 4.3%, p = .029, Wilcoxon sign-
rank = 26; shifted eyes: effect size: 11.2%, MSE: 3.4%, p = .013, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 7.5] (raw response rates, Table 2, second
row). Repeated-measures ANOVA, with eye position (intact/shifted eyes) and time of test (before/after learning) as factors,
revealed a highly signiﬁcant main effect of time of test [F(1,15) = 11.826, p = .004]; however, no signiﬁcant effect of eye posi-
tion [F(1,15) < 1] and no signiﬁcant interaction [F(1,15) < 1] were found, which conﬁrms the similar effect size for intact and
shifted eyes. In addition, using the Bayesian approach, we tested whether the absence of difference between unconscious
processing for intact and shifted eyes should be interpreted as an insufﬁcient experimental sensitivity or as positive evidence
in support of the absence of unconscious holistic processing. The data mean value was the difference in effect size between
intact and shifted eyes (equal to 0.83%), and the mean standard error of difference was 0.7%. The modeling parameters were
estimated based on the reduction of the effect for unconscious processing compared to conscious processing (as in Experi-
ment 1) and the effect size for intact vs. shifted visible faces (around 50%). Thus, the model’s mean was set to 5% and the
standard deviation was set to 5% (two-tailed normal distribution). The Bayes factor we found was 0.16, unequivocally sug-
gesting the absence of unconscious holistic processing.
Interestingly, as can be seen in Table 2 (second vs. ﬁrst raw), the learning effect was associated with an increase in the pro-
portion of ‘‘same’’ responses for the ‘‘same’’ invisible faces (but no major change for ‘‘different’’ invisible faces). To test this
statistically, for raw responses (‘‘same’’ responses), we ran three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with eyes position
(intact/shifted eyes), time of test (before/after learning) and invisible stimulus type (same/different faces) as factors. We
found signiﬁcant two-way interaction between time of test and invisible stimulus type F(1,15) = 11.826, p = .004]. The fol-
low-up repeated-measures ANOVA only for ‘‘same’’ invisible faces with eyes position (intact/shifted eyes) and time of test
(before/after learning) as factors revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of time of test [F(1,15) = 6.025, p = .027], no signiﬁcant
effect of eye position [F(1,15) = 2.596, p = .128] and no signiﬁcant interaction [F(1,15) < 1]. Similar repeated-measures ANOVA
only for ‘‘different’’ invisible faces revealed no signiﬁcant effects (insigniﬁcant main effect of time of test [F(1,15) < 1], eye
position [F(1,15) = 2.163, p = .162] and interaction between them [F(1,15) < 1]). Thus, we conclude that the learningwas asso-
ciatedwith increasing the number of ‘‘same’’ responses for ‘‘same’’ invisible faces, but no change for ‘‘different’’ invisible faces.
To ensure that faces were genuinely invisible, we ran awareness tests before and after learning (Fig. 3). These awareness
tests conﬁrmed that the faces were invisible before [intact eyes: d-prime: 0, MSE: 0.1, p = .84, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 36.5;
shifted eyes: d-prime: 0.023, MSE: 0.1, p = .97, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 45] and after [intact eyes: d-prime: 0.069, MSE: 0.096,
p = .43, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 46; shifted eyes: d-prime: 0.097, MSE: 0.12, p = .39, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 45] training. For both
types of eyes, no differences existed in visibility level before or after learning [intact eyes: p = .63, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 51.5;
shifted eyes: p = .68, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 60] and no signiﬁcant correlation existed across participants between the level of
face discrimination (awareness test) and level of eyes inﬂuence effect (eye judgment main task) [intact eyes: r(15) = 0.15,
p = .56; shifted eyes: r(15) = 0.28, p = .28]. Taken together, these results suggest that because of learning, participants’ judg-
ment of eyes was inﬂuenced by invisible faces. Critically, because the results for intact and shifted eyes were similar, we con-
clude that the effect is not related to unconscious holistic face processing [the classical composite face effect (Young et al.,
1987)].
Finally, we tested the ‘‘eyes-face’’ stimulus but now with visible faces (Fig. 4B, rightmost bars). The ﬁndings revealed that,
while in the intact eyes condition, faces inﬂuenced the perception of the eyes signiﬁcantly [effect size: 48.3%, MSE: 6.6%,
p < .001, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 1.5], the effect was completely abolished for the shifted eyes [effect size: 2.9%, MSE: 3.5%,
p = .44, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 34.5]. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that the shifted eyes manipulation disrupted holistic face process-
ing. To examine the difference between visible and invisible perception (after learning), we ran a two-way repeated-measures
ANOVA with visibility level (visible/invisible) and eye position (intact/shifted) as factors. The results showed a signiﬁcant
main effect of visibility level [F(1,15) = 11.7, p = .004], a signiﬁcant main effect of eye position [F(1,15) = 26.5, p < .001],
and a signiﬁcant interaction [F(1,15) = 22.9, p < .001]. To explore different patterns of visible and invisible processing further,
we ran a post hoc non-parametricWilcoxon Signed Rank test, which revealed a larger effect size for visible compared to invis-
ible for intact eyes [p < .0012,Wilcoxon sign-rank = 5.5] and a trend for a larger effect size for invisible compared to visible for
shifted eyes [p < .077, Wilcoxon sign-rank = 24.5].
4. Discussion
The objective of the current study was to test whether holistic face processing can occur outside of conscious awareness.
We used a novel ‘‘eyes-face’’ stimulus, where discrimination between sets of eyes was affected by the presentation of a
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faces inﬂuenced perception of visible eyes. Moreover, even after subliminal learning, when invisible faces biased judgments
of visible eyes, this effect was not found to be related to holistic face processing. Thus, we conclude, conscious awareness
may be necessary for holistic face processing.
The question of whether face recognition and face identity-related processing can be accomplished unconsciously has
been at the focus of research in recent years. In particular, several studies have shown that neither facial identity (Moradi
et al., 2005; Stein & Sterzer, 2011; Stone & Valentine, 2005) nor face gender/race (Amihai et al., 2011) is processed uncon-
sciously. In the current study, we hypothesized that, if holistic processing is a more basic component of face recognition, then
it might be possible to ﬁnd evidence for unconscious holistic face processing. To increase the chances of identifying this
effect, several steps were taken. First, the ‘‘eyes-face’’ stimulus used was optimized to generate a strong effect for visible
faces. That is, studies with a classical composite face illusion stimulus (top and bottom face halves) often use response time
to index holistic processing because response accuracy measures are often not sensitive enough (e.g., de Heering & Rossion,
2008; Wang, Li et al., 2012). Here, given the strong response accuracy effect for visible faces (Fig. 4B), relatively large amount
of room is left for a potential effect with invisible faces. Second, in Experiment 1, we used different sets of faces while aiming
to maximize perceptual differences between the faces (e.g., male and female faces). Third, by using the image set in Exper-
iment 1 with and without eyebrows, we ensured that the facial features (eyebrows) which were essential for inducing the
effect were as close as possible to the visible eyes rectangle. Finally, we employed a subliminal learning procedure, which
was successful in the sense that, as a result of learning, invisible faces inﬂuence responses regarding visible eyes (discrim-
ination of visible eyes). However, the fact that similar effects were found for intact and shifted eyes ruled out the interpre-
tation that the effect was related to holistic face processing. Thus, given that despite all aforementioned steps, no
unconscious holistic face processing effect could be found, we suggest that this process might not be processed uncon-
sciously, at least for the condition of dichoptic stimulation employed here.
The absence of holistic face processing outside conscious awareness is also interesting to consider in light of the recent
proposal that the holistic phenomenon, as it is measured in a composite task (e.g., Young et al., 1987), is a result of automatic
processing with a failure to allocate covert attention (Richler, Cheung et al., 2011). Accordingly, given that some deﬁne auto-
matic processes as unconscious (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979), one could have expected that face holistic processing might be
executed unconsciously. Several lines of evidence can reconcile our result with these expectations. First, the link between
automatic and unconscious processing is frequently made for the highly learned processes, like car driving (e.g., Charlton
& Starkey, 2011), which might involve awareness mechanisms different from the sensory (un)awareness for masked stimuli
used in our study. Second, the relationship between attention and consciousness is highly debated (for reivews: Koch &
Tsuchiya, 2007; Marchetti, 2012; Van Boxtel, Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2010) and it has been shown, for example, that two processes
can be dissociated (e.g., Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002). Yet, it is not clear whether a failure to allocate covert attention,
which might be a result of automatic processing (Richler, Cheung et al., 2011), can occur for invisible, unconscious stimuli.
Finally, a similar hypothesis had been proposed with regard to the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), which is also automatic
(MacLeod, 1991) and therefore can be processed unconsciously (Marcel, 1983). Yet, the empirical support for this hypothesis
is rather controversial: while some studies do ﬁnd an unconscious Stroop effect (e.g., Marcel, 1983), others claim that such an
effect can be explained by conscious awareness (Tzelgov, Porat, & Henik, 1997) or partial awareness (Kouider & Dupoux,
2004). Thus, in light of the evidence provided, the absence of unconscious holistic face processing might not be that
surprising.
The results reported here are interesting to consider in the context of unconscious processing of visual context in general.
The invisible surroundings can inﬂuence the orientation of a centrally presented visible grating (Clifford & Harris, 2005), and
the invisible surrounding luminance can modulate the perceived brightness of the centrally presented visible circle (Harris
et al., 2011). In addition, two studies have explored the perception of illusory contours surrounded by an invisible context,
and reported mixed results. One study found, using breaking continuous ﬂash suppression (Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007) that
an invisible Kanizsa triangle emerged into awareness faster than did a control stimulus (Wang, Weng, & He, 2012). The sec-
ond asked participants to indicate the direction of the Kanizsa triangle induced by the invisible surroundings and reported
only chance performance (Harris et al., 2011). Notably, the invisible context and the stimuli explored in the studies described
above were relatively simple stimuli, which are known to be processed at a relatively low level within the visual hierarchy
(e.g., V1 for line orientation, V4 for color processing). In contrast, faces are processed within high-level regions of the occip-
ito-temporal cortex (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000); therefore, it is plausible that low-level, but not high-level, context
can be processed unconsciously. Finally, Mudrik and colleagues recently demonstrated an interesting example of invisible
context processing (Mudrik et al., 2011), where the authors showed that invisible scenes containing incongruent invisible
objects emerged into awareness faster than did congruent scenes (see also: Mudrik & Koch, 2013). Yet, as the invisible con-
text in this study was semantic and not purely visual, there is no straightforward way to relate their ﬁndings to ours.
What might be the possible underlying neural mechanisms of the effect we observed? The neural network of face pro-
cessing is well characterized (Haxby et al., 2000), while the commonest and the most reproducible region across participants
is the Fusiform Face Area (FFA) (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). The FFA exhibits various properties pertinent to face
processing, such as partial view-invariance (e.g., Axelrod & Yovel, 2012; Grill-Spector et al., 1999; Kietzmann, Swisher, König,
& Tong, 2012) and discrimination between face identities (e.g., Gilaie-Dotan & Malach, 2007; Nestor, Plaut, & Behrmann,
2011; Rotshtein, Henson, Treves, Driver, & Dolan, 2005). More critical for the current discussion, however, is that the FFA
has been suggested to be responsible for holistic face processing (Andrews et al., 2010; Axelrod & Yovel, 2010, 2011;
V. Axelrod, G. Rees / Consciousness and Cognition 27 (2014) 233–245 243Schiltz & Rossion, 2006; Zhang, Li, Song, & Liu, 2012). If this is indeed the case, and assuming that unconscious information
can reach the FFA (e.g., Fahrenfort et al., 2012; Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002; Sterzer et al., 2008), then our result suggests that the
FFA operations responsible for holistic processing are associated with awareness; however, one should also consider that the
network of face-processing regions is distributed (Gobbini & Haxby, 2007) and spans not only the occipito-temporal cortex
(Op de Beeck, Haushofer, & Kanwisher, 2008) but also the frontal lobes (Axelrod & Yovel, 2013; Ishai, Schmidt, & Boesiger,
2005). As such, holistic processing might also require interactive processing between several different brain regions – the
type of distributed, long-range processing that was proposed to be associated with awareness (e.g., Dehaene & Changeux,
2011; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998). Overall, future research will be needed to gain a deeper understanding of
the underlying neural correlates.
A special note should be made regarding the subliminal learning procedure employed here. As discussed, the fact that,
during and after learning, invisible faces inﬂuenced both intact and shifted eyes suggests that the effect was not related
to holistic processing. We also found that the learning was associated with a more frequent ‘‘same’’ answer for the ‘‘same’’
invisible faces, but no change for ‘‘different’’ invisible faces. Yet, as the goal of the current study was not to explore the mech-
anisms of subliminal learning but rather to use this type of learning as a tool, it is not possible to clearly determine exactly
what type of information was learnt and how the learning occurred. It is plausible that, in the course of learning, participants
unconsciously learnt to associate between the ‘‘change’’ or ‘‘no change’’ of invisible images (faces) and the required response
for visible eyes. In other words, the same/different faces were treated as just same/different images. In addition, it is also
possible that motor response mapping associative learning occurred (Damian, 2001) while participants learnt to press ‘1’
when two invisible images were the same and ‘2’ when they were different. Notably, the learning procedure did not inﬂu-
ence face awareness, which was equally invisible before and after learning.
Finally, it should be noted that according to an alternative view of holistic processing, the effect that is measured by a
composite task might not be of a perceptual but rather a decisional nature (e.g., Richler, Gauthier, Wenger, & Palmeri,
2008; Richler, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2012; Rossion, 2013). In our study, to increase the sensitivity of the design, we included
only the pairs of the same eyes. That is, by requiring participants to discriminate between the same eyes, we imposed the
participants to set the same-different decision boundary at a low level. Indeed, this design was very sensitive, as we found
that context had large effects on eye perception for visible faces. Yet, this design had its downside as well; since no different
pairs of eyes were included, our ability to estimate potential response bias was limited (e.g., Richler et al., 2012; Rossion,
2013). Critically, the main goal of the present study was to explore whether invisible faces inﬂuence the discrimination of
visible eyes, regardless of the nature of holistic processing.
To conclude, in the current study we explored the question of whether holistic processing can take place outside of con-
scious awareness. Using three different sets of face images and applying a procedure of subliminal learning, we demon-
strated that conscious visual awareness might be a prerequisite for holistic processing.Acknowledgments
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